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ABSTRACT
As the result of the deliberations of the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission, the Department of Defense will close or realign over 100
military installations, at a cost of over $5.5 billion. This study provides an analysis
of the effect of budget reductions on military force structure realignment. The
realignment of P-3 squadrons that results from the closure of NAS Barbers Point
is used as a case analysis to gain insight into the effect of BRAC related Military
Construction (MILCON) reductions on the P-3 force structure decisions.
The thesis compares MILCON cost figures for the various P-3 realignment
options that are being or have been considered, then draws conclusions on the
effect of MILCON deferrals on this realignment. The enclosed data indicates that
the NAS Whidbey Island single-site plan will save over $100 million in up-front
MILCON cost as compared to dual-site plans that include MCAS Kaneohe Bay as
a P-3 receiver site. Also, the effect of BRAC-related MILCON deferrals will be
to significantly increase OMN and MPN account costs over the FYDP by forcing
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The United States is currently experiencing federal budget
deficits of unprecedented peacetime magnitude. This fact,
combined with the breakup of the former Soviet Union, has
brought about an era of decreasing defense budgets. The Soviet
threat that had previously defined the military force
structure and justified its spending level has all but
vanished. The increased pressure to cut the budget deficit and
the inherent political difficulty in reducing mandatory
entitlements have made the Department of Defense a prime
target for trimming. For these reasons, U.S. defense spending
(as a percentage of gross domestic product) in 1993 dipped to
its lowest level since the post World War II drawdown
[Ref. 1].
As the U.S. military downsizes, tremendous savings can be
realized through the closure and realignment of military
facilities in both the United States and abroad. This so
called "peace dividend" may indeed help to reduce the federal
budget deficit. The removal of excess capacity in Defense
Department base structure can no doubt yield substantial
savings, but whether expected funding levels will support the
restructuring is yet to be determined. Making decisions
regarding reduction in military facilities has been difficult
in the past due to the parochial interests of members of
Congress. Legislators were so effective at keeping the
installations in their districts from closing that from 1977'
until the first Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in
1988, not a single major facility was closed [Ref. 2].
Realizing that conventional legislative procedures were
ineffective for the base closure process, Navy Department
officials have taken great care to establish policies and
procedures that make the base closure screening and selection
process both efficient and effective [Ref. 3]. The
Department of Defense established the Commission on Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in May, 1988, and gave the
Commission its official power later that year when it passed
Public Law 100-526. This Defense Authorization Amendments and
Base Closure and Realignment Act requires the President and
Congress to accept all or none of the Commission's realignment
and closure recommendations. The Commission consists of eight
Presidentially appointed members whose charter was extended
in 1990 to include 1991,1993, and 1995 closure rounds.
Since its formation in 1988, the BRAC Commission has been
asked to make the difficult decisions on the closure and
realignment of military facilities. In determining which bases
' Congress passed legislation in 1977 that gave the Armed Services Committees the
power to review all military base closure decisions, effectively giving Congress power to
make all base closure decisions.
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should be closed or realigned, a number of factors are used to
present an accurate overall picture. The primary issue is
present and projected future operational requirements for the
installation, including excess capacity needs. The next factor
is the issue of estimated impact on local communities. If a
community is largely dependent on the base for employment and
tax support and has few other sources of income, it may be
devastated by a closure decision. The final major
consideration is initial closure costs and the amount of time
projected to pay back the initial costs given the annual
savings. This evaluation of the estimated cost savings of each
proposed closure is a vital part of the process, since the
overall objective of base closure and realignment is to
eliminate excess capacity and avoid future costs.
To evaluate the potential costs and savings of the base
closure alternatives under consideration, the BRAC Commission
has developed a cost estimating model that attempts to capture
all essential costs and savings associated with each
alternative. This model, the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
(COBRA) model, was developed by the U.S. Air Force Cost Center
in conjunction with the Logistics Management Institute. The
model uses data that is available to the military department
staffs without extensive field studies. This data is then used
to compare the relative cost differences among the various
3
base-closure alternatives. Correct quantitative input of
dollar values is essential if this is to be an accurate
analysis and useful decision tool.
B. OBJECTIVE
The core of this thesis is a case study on military
facility realignment and the associated costs. The thesis
focuses on the realignment plan for NAS Whidbey Island,
Washington and other facilities affected by the realignment.
Aspects considered will include the cost of implementing the
realignment plan, anticipated funding levels, and the expected
impact of any funding shortfall.
NAS Whidbey Island is one of three master jet bases on
the west coast and is home to 11 EA-6B squadrons, 5 A-6
squadrons, and a reserve P-3 squadron. The BRAC Commission
determined in both 1991 and 1993 that NAS Whidbey Island will
remain open. With the A-6 fleet slated for retirement by
1998, NAS Whidbey will have a gradually increasing excess
capacity over the next four years. This excess capacity will
be filled with a yet-to-be-determined number of P-3 squadrons
relocated from NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii (selected for closure
by BRAC 93) and NAS Moffett Field (selected for closure by
Brac 91). It is unclear if the funding level from Congress and
the Defense Department will match all of the realignment
costs. Hangar space and intermediate maintenance facility
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requirements, as well as the cost associated with additional
military personnel in the area are examples of variables that
will determine if this realignment plan is funded adequately.
Also unclear is how this realignment plan will affect
future BRAC options regarding NAS Whidbey Island. Possible
options include the consolidation of U.S. based USAF and/or
USMC Electronic Countermeasures aircraft with the Navy EA-6B
fleet at NAS Whidbey Island. The USAF EF-III's are currently
based at Mountain Home AFB, ID, while USMC EA-6B's are based
at MCAS Cherry Point, NC.
The unique electronic warfare training facilities and
abundance of special use airspace at NAS Whidbey Island make
it an ideal site for consolidation of EW assets. The Federal
Aviation Administration, out of concern for civil aviation
safety, recommended in 1991 that the EF-111 fleet at Mountain
Home AFB be relocated to NAS Whidbey Island [Ref. 4].
Movement of USMC aircraft from MCAS Cherry Point to NAS
Whidbey Island would provide efficiency of combined logistics




* Are the facilities involved in the relocation of P-3
squadrons from NAS Barbers Point likely to be provided
adequate funding to implement the plan, and if not,how
will the shortfall effect plan implementation?
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Subsidiary Research Questions:
"* Is the current data call procedure for BRAC reducing the
efficiency and effectiveness of realignment and closure by
forcing the submission of budgetarily unexecutable cost
data?
"* What impact will budgeting for realignment have on future
realignment options at NAS Whidbey Island and other Naval
and Marine Corps air stations?
D. SCOPE
This thesis provides an analysis of the key factors
involved in the realignment of Naval Air Stations, focusing
on NAS Whidbey Island. The factors analyzed are the cost of
relocation to the facilities involved and the level of funding
provided by the Defense Department and Congress.
Information is assimilated to improve cost and budgetary
analysis in the closure and realignment process in the future.
E. METHODOLOGY
1. This thesis identifies the various cost categories
related to the realignment plan. This is accomplished through
telephone and personal interviews and literature searches, and
from 6 years of personal experience at NAS Whidbey Island.
2. It determines the specific periods of focus where costs
will be incurred and identifies the specific cost variables to
be measured
3. It identifies the cost data sources through interviews
and literature searches.
4. It determines anticipated funding levels to the
6
facilities involved in the relocation. This is accomplished
through telephone and personal interviews at command levels.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is divided into five chapters, beginning with
this introduction. Chapter II presents a brief history of the
facilities involved in this realignment plan and an overview
of the base closure and realignment process. It also describes
the factors considered when closing a military facility and
preparing it for disposal, as well as a background of
decisions that have been made relating to NAS Whidbey Island
and NAS Barbers Point.
Chapter III provides identification of the many
operational and cost variables that are crucial to
determinating closure and realignment criteria. This ir-ludes
the methodology for deriving costs and funding levels.
Chapter IV gives the results of BRAC 93 for the facilities
involved and presents an overview of the various P-3
realignment options that have been considered. It also
presents the cost figures from each for comparison.
Chapter V assesses the impact of the current funding
level, summarizes the findings, and discusses the value of the
study to future closure and realignment decision-makers.
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11. BASE CLOSURE HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the history of the overall base
closure process and the specific BRAC findings involving the
air stations related to this P-3 realignment. It is divided
into eight sections, including this introduction. Section B
gives a brief history of the events that led to the creation
of the BRAC Commission in 1988. Section C gives an overview of
the BRAC selection process and criteria and describes the
make-up of the Commission. Section D describes the Department
of Navy selection process and the makeup and mission of the
Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC). Section E
summarizes the role of the General Accounting Office in the
closure and realignment process. Section F presents an
overview of the aircraft types involved in the various P-3
realignment options being considered. Sections G and H give an
overview of the 1991 BRAC findings for the air stations
involved and presents a brief history of each.
B. BACKGROUND
It became apparent to Defense Department officials in the
1960's that many bases had considerable excess capacity. This
inefficiency prompted the closure of many facilities by the
authority of the Defense Department (Ref. 5]. The end
8
of the Vietnam conflict in the early 1970's further enhanced
the need for closure of unnecessary military facilities. These
closures were executed with minimal Congressional consultation
and the subsequent political backlash was far greater than
Congress thought possible. The closure process all but stopped
when Congress in 1977 enacted section 2687 of title 10, which
required congressional notification and lengthy environmental
studies on all closure candidates.
As the military force structure was reduced following the
end of the "Cold War," the excess capacity issue continued to
surface as the force structure declined and the base structure
became bloated. Readiness was threatened as the services
struggled to pay the operating costs of unneeded bases. The
demand for a continued base closure process resulted in the
passage of Public Law 100-526 in October 1988, which created
the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The law
charged the Commission with recommending installations for
closure or realignment based on an independent study of the
base structure. Concerns over political bias within the
Commission prompted the passage of Public Law 101-510, the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. This new
statute calls for public hearings to be conducted for all
closure candidates with records of the proceedings to be open
to full review by the public. The law also requires the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a thorough analysis
9
of the BRAC Commission's selection process. The Commission was
directed to meet to determine base closure and realignment
candidates in 1991, 1993, and 1995.
C. BASE REALIGlMMET AND CLOSD1B COWISSION
Congress created the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission "to provide a fair process that will result in the
timely closure and realignment of military installations
inside the United States" (Ref. 6]. The new closure
candidate selection process was designed to be less
susceptible to political parochialism than previous selection
processes. An audit of the closure and realignment selection
process by GAO was established to ensure that an appropriate
"paper trail" of justifications was maintained.
Public Law 101-510 calls for the President to appoint
eight members to the BRAC commission, six of whom are based on
congressional recommendations. All appointees are subject to
Senate confirmation. The Commission Chair is to serve through
the 1995 round with all others serving only for the remainder
of that Congressional session.
The BRAC final selection criteria delineated in Public
Law 101-510 are as follows [Ref. 7]:
"* The current and future mission requirements and the impact
in operational readiness of the Defense Department's total
force.
"* The availability and condition of land, facilities, and
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associated airspace at both the existing and potential
receiving locations.
"* The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and
future total force requirements at both the existing and
potential receiving locations.
"* The cost of manpower implications.
"* The extent and timing of potential costs and savings,
including the number of years for the savings to exceed
the costs.
"* The economic impact on communities.
"* The ability of both the existing and potential receiving
communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions,
and personnel.
"* The environmental impact.
The above criteria were also adhered to by the Department of
Defense and the Navy Department in the selection of closure
candidates.
The statute requires the Secretary of Defense to base all
recommendations on a force structure plan submitted to
Congress with the Department's budget recommendation and on
selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and
approved by Congress. The FY 94 plan, submitted to the
Commission on March 12, 1993, incorporated an assessment of
the probable threats to national security during the FY 94 to
99 period, and took into account the anticipated funding
levels for the period. The plan was classified secret and
included sections on threat assessment, the need for overseas
basing, and the force structure implementation plan.
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Upon the Commission's receipt of the Defense Secretary's
recommendations, PL 101-510 requires the Commission to hold
public hearings to discuss the recommendations before it makes
any findings. Before the Commission can change any of the
secretary's recommendations, by law it must find substantial
deviation from the Defense Secretary's force structure plan
and from the final criteria approved by Congress.
D. THE NAVY PROCESS
The Department of Navy candidate selection process for the
1991 closure round brought significant criticism from the BRAC
Commission and GAO. The BRAC Commission and GAO agreed that
there had been inadequate documentation of the Navy's decision
making process and deliberation results. The Commission
indicated that the Navy recommendations could result in
closure of bases and installations with higher military value
than those chosen to remain open.
The Department of the Navy issued SECNAVNOTE 11000 on
April 22, 1992 as a response to these criticisms. This Navy
Department regulation provided comprehensive guidance for the
1993 round of base closures and realignments for the Navy. It
established the Navy's Base Structure Evaluaticr Committee
(BSEC) as the principal organization to prepare
recommendations for the Department of Defense and the BRAC
Commission for closures and realignments. The BSEC was to be
an eight-person committee that would be chaired by the
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Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and
Environment). In January of 1993, the acting Secretary of the
Navy appointed Charles P. Nemfakos, who was then vice-chairman
of the BSEC , as chairman of the BSEC. SECNAVNOTE 11000 also
established the Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) and
charged it with providing support to the BSEC
[Ref. 8].
The BSEC was responsible for the following actions:
1. The development of categories of installations;
2. The determination of whether excess capacity existed in
any given category or subcategory;
3. Where excess capacity existed, the determination of the
military value of each installation in the affected category
or subcategory;
4. The evaluation of methodologies to reduce or eliminate
excess capacity and the evaluation of the return on
investment, economic, community infrastructure, and
environmental impacts resulting from proposed alternatives
for closure or realignment;
5. Based on the above analytical methodology, the
development of a list of Navy Department installations
recommended for closure or realignment.
The BSEC process consisted of two phases. Phase one
involved development and validation of the Navy Base Structure
Data Base (BSDB). This data base contained information
relevant to closure on all Navy bases and was to be "the sole
and authoritative Navy Department data base for making closure
13
and realignment recommendations." The BSAT staff coordinated
the data calls which were the means of acquiring the
information needed for analysis by the BSEC. In phase two the
BSEC used the BSDB for analysis and determination of closure
and realignment candidates.
Due to the criticisms of the Navy process in 19912, the
BSEC took significant measures to ensure an adequate "paper
trail" existed following the 1993 rounds. Those involved in
supplying information on their activities and bases were held
accountable for accuracy at all levels within the commands.
Many involved in the process believe the above measures led to
a more efficient Navy base closure process in 1993.
The Navy submitted 28 major closure or realignment
recommendations in 1993. This was the largest number among the
services and defense agencies. The overriding goal of the Navy
process was the elimination of as much excess base capacity as
possible. Implicit in this goal was the assumption that the
results would represent savings to the Navy while retaining
the base structure necessary to meet force structure needs.
The approach was to review similar types of bases by category
and minimize the excess capacity in that category.
2The BRAC Commission and GAO agreed there had been inadequate documentation
of the Navy's 1991 decision-making process and deliberation results.
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The Navy first determined whether excess capacity existed
in each base category, then compared existing capacity in each
category to the anticipated requirement based on the 1993
force structure plan. Capacity was determined on a category-
by-category basis but was generally an estimate based on
current facilities and equipment. For example, Naval Station
requirements were determined using the number of ships
projected to be in the force in the final year of the force
structure plan. Major support requirements such as shipyards
and naval aviation depots were more difficult to determine and
were based on anticipated work load.
Military value assessments were also made on a category-
by-category basis and were evaluated along with capacity
considerations in developing recommendations. When a category
of bases was determined to have excess capacity, all bases in
that category were evaluated against four military value
criteria. The military value score for each base in a category
was generally derived from answers to as many as 151
questions. The questions were assigned point values and an
average military value was then computed for each category.
The four military value criteria were: readiness, facilities,
mobilization, and cost/manpower.
Critical to the Navy's process was a configuration
analysis designed to eliminate as much excess capacity as
possible in each category while retaining or improving the
15
overall military value average. It is important to note,
however, that in the Navy's configuration analysis the average
military value for a category of bases was more important than
individual military value scores for the bases in that
category. This was due to the scope of the analysis, which was
category-wide rather than on a base-versus-base level.
The Navy conducted deliberations on configurations using
1999 force structure requirements and applying analysis in a
manner designed to minimize excess capacity by category. The
solutions, however, were not based solely on quantitative
analysis, because assumptions based on military judgements
were an important part of the process and its results. For
example, the naval station analysis assumed that the split
between ships located on the East and West coasts would remain
consistent with current practice.
When the Navy believed it had reached the best solution in
terms of capacity reduction and military value average in a
category, a calculation of return-on-investment was run to
confirm that the results of the analysis would indeed produce
savings. In only a few cases was the return-on-investment
analysis run on more than one scenario. This was done to test
the feasibility of an alternative, not to determine which of
the alternatives produced the greatest savings.
Once a closure scenario for a category was identified,
evaluations were done based on the three remaining criteria:
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economic, environmental, and community impact on the closure
area. These assessments were generally done only for the final
recommendations.
The goal of excess capacity reduction for the operational
air station categor. involved capacity measurements of apron
and hangar space for various types of aircraft based on
established standards. The military values were determined
from the responses to 95 questions generated by the Navy in
consultation with technical experts.
E. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Under PL 101-150, GAO evaluates the Department of
Defense's selection process, provides the Commission and
Congress their detailed analysis of the process, and assists
the Commission in its review and analysis of the Defense
Secretary's recommendations. Nine professional staff members
are detailed by the GAO to serve full-time on the Commission's
review and analysis teams. The detailees participate fully in
each phase of the review and analysis effort. They verify
data, visit candidate bases, participate in local hearings,
and testify before the Commission at its public hearings.
Additionally, GAO field personnel visit bases to gather
information first-hand and to verify data solicited by the
Commission.
The GAO review of the Navy process and its implementation
centered on several categories of bases. The GAO analysis
17
found that the Navy process did eliminate excess capacity and
would produce savings. However, the Navy did not routinely
seek alternative closure scenarios in order to assess relative
cost savings, since excess capacity reduction was the
objective.
GAO reviewed the configuration analysis and traced
decisions regarding the rules for air stations to minutes of
Navy deliberations. One of these rules, for example, was that
a 67 percent active and 100 percent reserve aircraft basing
requirement was to be preserved. Subject to military
judgement, these rules guided the configuration analysis. The
GAO review of the configuration analysis showed the importance
the Navy placed on excess capacity reduction. It also
illustrates that some bases recommended for closure had a




The Lockheed P-3 Orion is the Navy's standard shore-
based anti-submarine patrol aircraft. P-3 aircraft squadrons
are currently based at two East coast locations and at NAS
Barbers Point, Hawaii. The realignment plan for the P-3's at
rlhe Navy operates a variety of activities and functions, such as Naval Stations,
aviation depots, training centers, etc. The Navy's approach of reviewing bases by category
means that a Naval Station chosen to stay open could have a lower military value score
than an Aviation Depot selected for closure.
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NAS Barbers Point (selected for closure by BRAC 93) is the
subject of this thesis.
First deliveries of production P-3 aircraft began in
1962 in response to a Navy request for maritime patrol
aircraft design proposals in 1957. The Orion is a conversion
of the Electra civil airliner and has ample room for Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) equipment and operators. The total
crew is normally 10 to 12, five of whom are tactical
specialists working in a compartment within the main cabin
which contains the detection equipment. The latest model of
the Orion , the P-3C, is powered by four 4,910 shp Allison T-
56 turboprops, which give a top speed of 473 mph and an
endurance of over 17 hours. Because of the long endurance, a
large crew rest area with galley is provided in the main
cabin. Maximum takeoff weight is 135,000 lbs and dimensions
include a span of 99 ft 8 in and an overall length of 116 ft
10 in. ASW sensors include radar, ESM (Electronic Surveillance
Measures), MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection), active and
passive sonobuoys and the associated acoustic processing
equipment, low-light TV and FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared
Radar). Offensive armament includes up to 15,000 lbs of depth
charges, homing torpedoes, or mines in an internal bay and on
10 external hardpoints. Unguided rockets or AGM-84 Harpoon
anti-ship missiles can be carried under the wings, with a
maximum weapons load of 20,000 lbs.
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2. A-6 Intruder
The Grumman A-6 Intruder is the Navy's carrier-based
medium attack aircraft. Lessons learned from the Korean War
convinced Navy officials of the need for a long-range, low-
level, tactical strike aircraft capable of operating in poor
weather. Designs were solicited in 1957 with first delivery of
production aircraft in 1963. Many modifications to the
original platform have been made over the years, including the
addition of a Norden multi-mode attack/navigation radar
integrated with FLIR and laser detection equipment. The
aircraft has a maximum ordnance load of more than 17,000 lbs,
which represents about 30 percent of its take-off weight. The
Intruder can carry a greater variety of weapons, nuclear or
conventional, than any previous naval aircraft.
The Intruder is powered by two J-52 turbojets and has
a maximum speed of 685 mph at sea level. The aircraft has a
wingspan of 53 ft and a length of 54 ft 9 in. The ordnance is
carried on one underfuselage and four underwing attachments
and can consist of conventional, incendiary, or laser-guided
bombs, rocket pods, nuclear weapons, or auxiliary fuel tanks.
All U.S.-based Pacific fleet A-6 squadrons, when not deployed,
are based at NAS Whidbey Island . The A-6 squadrons based at
NAS Whidbey Island and on the East coast are being gradually
retired and will be fully decommissioned by 1998.
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3. ZA-63 Prowler
The Grumman EA-6B Prowler is the Navy's carrier-based
electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft. The mission of the
Prowler is to mislead or suppress enemy radars while acting as
escort for carrier-based strike aircraft. Externally the
Prowler looks similar to the A-6 except the nose section has
been extended by 4 ft 6 in and a fin pod housing containing
surveillance receivers has been mounted on the tail of the
aircraft. The major changes are internal and include
accommodation for two additional crew members, reinforced
wings and landing gear to match the higher gross weight,
increased fuel capacity, and more powerful engines. The
Prowler is powered by two Pratt & Whitney J52 turbojets and
has a maximum speed at sea level of 651 mph. The aircraft has
a maximum take-off weight of 61,500 lbs and a wing span of 53
ft. Offensive armament is limited to the AGM-88 HARM (High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile) missile.
The Prowler's advanced ECM is based upon the ALQ-99
tactical jamming system, and up to ten jamming transmitters
can be carried. The jammers are packaged in up to five
external pods, each with electrical power provided by a
turbogenerator on the nose. A central computer processes
sensor and receiver information, enabling detection,
identification, and jamming to be initiated automatically, or
with manual assistance from the back-seat crew. All U.S.-based
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EA-6B squadrons are based at NAS Whidbey Island when not
deployed. The Prowler will be an important part of Navy
carrier airwing capability for some time as no replacement
aircraft platform has been selected.
4. F/A-18 Hornet
The McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet is the Navy's
successor to the F-4 phantom and A-7 Corsair. It is a single
seater and is powered by two GE F404 turbofans. Maximum speed
at sea level is 1300 mph and combat radius in the fighter role
is 425 nautical miles, increasing to 580 nm for the attack
mission. The Hornet Wingspan is 37 ft 6 in, length 56 ft, and
maximum take-off weight is 45,000 lbs. Built-in armament is an
M-61 Vulcan cannon and up to 19,000 lbs of external ordnance
can be lifted. For air-to-air combat, two Sparrows are carried
under the fuselage, with two Sidewinders on the wingtips and
four wing hardpoints also available for Air-to-Air Missiles
(AAMs).
The Hornet's principle sensor is the APG-65 radar, a
multi-mode air-to-air and air-to-ground system. The pilot can
operate it simply by using controls mounted on the throttle
and control column, with the data displayed on a HUD (heads-up
display). Navigation, weapons control, and sensor operation
are all highly computerized to ease the pilot's workload and
to compensate for the lack of a second crewmember. Twenty-
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four USMC F/A-18 Hornets are currently stationed at MCAS
Kaneohe Bay as part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) located there.
0. AS WHIDDEY ISLAMND
1. Descrilption of Mission
NAS Whidbey Island is on Whidbey Island, Washington,
located 45 miles north of Seattle. The local community is the
city of Oak Harbor, Washington. NAS Whidbey Island is one of
only three Navy "master jet bases" located on the west coast.
The island is accessible from the mainland by Deception Pass
bridge on the far north of the island and by a 15-minute ferry
ride to Seattle on the south end of the island.
NAS Whidbey Island was commissioned on September 21,
1942. The station was originally used for seaplane patrol
operations, rocket firing training, torpedo overhaul, and
recruit training. Following World War II, the base was placed
on reduced operating status. In December of 1949, a program
was initiated to increase the operations and capabilities of
the station.
It is now home for all of the Navy's U.S.-based EA-
6B electronic warfare aircraft and all Pacific Fleet A-6E
medium-attack squadrons. Reserve EA-6B, P-3, and C-9 squadrons
are also based at NAS Whidbey Island.
As of the initial rounds of base closure and
realignments in 1991, the air station was composed of the
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Commander, Medium Attack Electronic Warfare Wing, Pacific
Fleet, COMMATVAQWINGPAC' 4 , consisting of two fleet replacement
squadrons and 18 fleet squadrons, four reserve squadrons, a
Naval Hospital, Naval Facility', for a total of 24 tenant
commands and visiting units. In total, over 24,500 people
including civilian employees and dependents were employed at
NAS Whidbey Island [Ref. 9]. As of 1991, the air
station provided a payroll of $294 million to military and
civilian employees working and living on or near the air
station. Many of Island County's citizens are retired
military, representing a significant economic influence within
the community.
The station also maintains an auxiliary landing field
at Coupeville, Washington. This outlying field (OLF) is for
conducting field carrier landing practice (FCLP) in
preparation for deployments aboard aircraft carriers. NAS
Whidbey Island also maintains two target complexes for
training of A-6E aircrews in weapons delivery. These
complexes are located at Boardman, Oregon and Spokane,
Washington.
4Commander, Medium Attack, Electronic Warfare Wing Pacific Fleet was disestablished
in 1993; Medium Attack (A-6E) and Electronic Warfare (EA-6B) are now separate
commands.
5The Naval Fadlity's mission at NAS Whidbey is basically to support the fleet with
timely detection of surface and sub-surface naval contacts.
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2. 1991 3SzC and BRAC Findings
The 1991 Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee
recommended to the Department of Defense that NAS Whidbey and
its hospital be closed. They further recommended the
associated aviation activities be transferred to NAS Lemoore,
California. The Naval Facility at Whidbey would remain open
and the weapons ranges would remain in Navy custody. All land
and associated facilities not transferrable to Lemoore would
be disposed of by the Navy [Ref. 8]. NAS Whidbey was graded
"low" in military value by the Navy's Base Structure
Evaluation Committee for the following reasons:
"• Available capacity at NAS Lemoore, California.
"* Single runway configuration at NAS Whidbey which limits
operational flexibility and future growth.
"* Encroachment at NAS Whidbey outlying field.
"* Reduction of A-6E aircraft.
"* Substantial reduction in maritime patrol aircraft which
were previously planned to backfill A-6E mission reduction
at NAS Whidbey Island.
"* Previous studies to relocate EA-6B squadrons to NAS
Lemoore and eventually consolidate all west coast attack
squadrons at NAS Lemoore.
Following Department of Defense selection criteria,
the Base Structure Evaluation Committee determined that the
closure of NAS Whidbey and the hospital would cause the loss
of over 11,700 jobs with a 58.3% cumulative loss of employment
in Island county. The committee determined that additional
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facilities would be required at NAS Lemoore due to the
movement of aviation squadrons and their families. There
would be a $492 million cost for implementing the BSEC
decision, supported by the Defense Department, with a
projected subsequent annual savings of $76 million
[Ref. 10].
The BRAC determined that the Navy recommendation for
closing NAS Whidbey would have a more pronounced affect on a
local community than would any of its other proposed closings.
The Commission further determined that the Defense Department
underestimated the costs of moving the aviation squadrons to
Lemoore. There also was the problem of NAS Whidbey's runways
lacking the versatility required for future growth due to a
supposed single-runway configuration6 . In fact, Whidbey
consists of a dual-runway configuration providing versatility
with changing wind conditions.
The Commission determined that existing noise and
encroachment problems' supporting the Navy decision were not
•'he lack of parallel runways at NAS Whidbey was a key point in the argument to
move the Whidbey squadrons to NAS Lemoore, which has parallel runways.
7There is a small but vocal group of citizens that resides near the Navy's outlying field
in Coupeville. This field is located 10 miles south of NAS Whidbey and is used for FCLPs
(Field Carrier Landing Practice). The group, Whidbey Islanders for a Sound Environment
(WISE), is campaigning for partial or total reduction of tactical aviation in the Whidbey
area.
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as severe as at most of the other air stations under
consideration. There also had been no zoning in the community
that would significantly impact future expansion of the air
station. Another significant finding of the Commission, based
on FAA studies, was that operating the EA-6B and training its
aircrews in California would have a detrimental effect on the
national air space system and would hurt safety and efficiency
[Ref. 9].
In order to change any of the Defense Department
recommendations, the BRAC Commission is required by Public Law
101-510 to find substantial deviation from the Secretary's
force structure plan and the final criteria approved by
Congress [Ref. 5]. In the case of NAS Whidbey for the 1991
round of base closures, the Commission made the following
recommendation based on their findings:
The Commission finds that DOD deviated substantially from
the force-structure plan and from criteria 1 and 3 by not
accurately focussing on the current and future mission
requirements of the carrier medium-attack mission; it also
inaccurately assessed the availability of land,
facilities, and air space at the current location and the
full impacts on facilities and air space at Naval Air
Station Lemoore. Therefore, the Coission recommends
that Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and the supporting
Naval Hospital Oak Harbor remain open.
H. HAWAII AIR STLIONS
1. NAS Barbers Point Mission Description
Naval Air Station Barbers Point is located on the
southwestern plain of Ewa on the island of Oahu in the state
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of Hawaii. It is the largest Naval Air Station in the Pacific
and consists of more than 3,700 acres. It provides employment
and/or services for 12,000 military members, their family
members, and civilian employees. NAS Barbers Point is home
port for several maritime surveillance and antisubmarine
warfare aircraft squadrons as well as the U. S. Coast Guard
and the U. S. Army.
In late 1939 the Navy acquired more than 3,500 acres
from the estate of James Campbell. On these acres was built
the Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, which is now NAS Barbers
Point. The Ewa air strip was completed in early 1941, and
naval facilities construction was well under way by late that
year when the Japanese attack on U. S. Forces there caused the
United States' entrance into World War II. The station was
commissioned NAS Barbers Point on April 15, 1942, with a
complement of 14 officers and 242 enlisted men.
The start of the Korean conflict in 1950 saw the NAS
Barbers Point logistic and support role become paramount for
forward deploying squadrons in the Pacific. The late 60's and
early 70's saw Barbers Point providing increasing support to
U. S. military commitments in southeast Asia. In June, 1973,
with the reorganization of naval units in the Pacific, NAS
Barbers Point became an operational shore command under the
control of Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) located
in San Diego, CA. Also during this time, Commander, Patrol
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S.... . .  .. . .  .. .  .. .. .. ....
Wing Two (COMPATWINGTWO) acquired direct operational control
of five maritime patrol(VP) squadrons, Patron Special Projects
Unit Two (VPU-2), and VQ-3.
Commander, Patrol Wing U. S. Pacific Fleet
(COMPATWINGSPAC) moved from NAS Moffett Field, CA, to NAS
Barbers Point in July, 1993, replacing COMPATWINGTWO. The
recent addition of VP-9 and VP-47 from NAS Moffett Field
results in the following major aviation units currently
assigned as tenant activities of the station: COMPATWINGSPAC;
VP-I, VP-4, VP-9, VP-17, VP-22, and VP-47; VPU-2; HSL-37; the
Coast Guard air station and the Army's 214th Aviation
Regiment.
Personnel at the U. S. Coast Guard Air Station (CGAS)
fly the C-130 Hercules aircraft and HH-65 Dolphin helicopters
in performance of Search And Rescue (SAR) missions within the
Central Pacific maritime region. Its aircraft also conduct
water pollution patrols throughout the Hawaiian Islands chain.
The U. S. Army's B Company 214th Aviation Regiment
relocated to Barbers Point in 1974 from Wheeler AFB due to
overcrowding. The large C-147C Chinooks support the Army's
25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, located 30 nm to
the North.
The Patrol squadrons at NAS Barbers Point fly the P-
3C update 11.5 and III versions of the Orion Aircraft, a
military version of the Lockheed Electra. The range of the P-3
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and its ability to fly slowly make the aircraft ideal for
maritime surveillance and ASW missions. The VP squadrons are
also called upon to fly SAR operations and medical evacuations
(MEDEVAC).
2. MCAS Kaneohe Say Mission Description
Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay is the home of
the First Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and First Radio
Battalion. The mission of the first MEB is to provide combat-
ready air-ground forces capable of executing amphibious
assault and maritime pre-positioning force operations as
directed by national authorities. The MEB combines an Aviation
Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), a
Communications Service Support Element (CSSE), and a Command
Element (CE) into one cohesive force.
The station is located on 2,951 acres of the Mokapu
Peninsula on the Northeast coast of the island of Oahu and is
home to approximately 15,000 marines, sailors, and their
families. The air station is separated from the downtown
Honolulu/Pearl Harbor area by the Koolau mountain range, which
runs approximately 22 miles along the length of the East side
of Oahu from North to South.
Although the station has been a Marine Corps facility
only since the early 1950's, the Mokapu peninsula has a rich
military and Hawaiian history dating back to the ancient
Hawaiians. The U.S. Military began to use the peninsula in
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1918 when the Kuwaaohe Military Reservation was commissioned
on its Eastern shore. In 1939, the Navy began construction of
a small seaplane base, and the area was commissioned a Naval
Air Station in July, 1941. On December 7, 1941, NAS Kaneohe
Bay and its long-range reconnaissance aircraft were targeted
during the Japanese surprise attack. During the attack on
Kaneohe, the Japanese Navy suffered its first aircraft loss,
and a Kaneohe Bay sailor became one of the first World War II
recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Following the war the Navy decommissioned the base. It
was recommissioned a Marine Corps Air Station on January 15,
1952. Its position in the North Central Pacific makes it an
ideal location for strategic deployment to the Far East.
3. 1991 BSEC and BRAC Findings
The 1991 BRAC Commission selected NAS Barbers Point as
a receiver site for an unspecified number of P-3 squadrons
from NAS Moffett Field, California, which was selected for
closure. The specific recommendation of the Commission was as
follows:
Naval Air Station Moffett Field is recommended for
closure. Three active maritime patrol squadrons will be
decommissioned and the remaining active duty maritime
patrol squadrons will be relocated to NAS Barbers Point,
HI, NAS Brunswick, ME, and NAS Jacksonville, FL. A single
P-3 Fleet Replacement Pquadron(FRS) will be sited at
Jacksonville.
The decommissioning of three squadrons refers to the
Pacific fleet portion of a "rightsizing" of the P-3 community
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from 24 to 18 squadrons. The Commission cited reductions in
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) as justification for reducing
the MPA support shore infrastructure by one air station. The
BSEC considered for closure, on an equal basis, all four MPA
installations along with all other air stations. NAS Moffett
Field was graded low in military value for the following
reasons:
* Air operations at NAS Moffett Field are s-verely
encroached by air traffic at San Francisco International
and San Jose and Palo Alto Municipal Airports, and air
accident potential zones are particularly severe to the
south with multi-family residential development.
* NAS Moffett Field operations cannot be expanded due to
adjacent development. Planned multi-story construction
will further encroach on operations.
* NAS Moffett Field is located in a high-cost region.
Supporting documents from the BRAC deliberations
indicated a Commission desire for each of the remaining P-3
bases (NAS Jacksonville, Florida, NAS Brunswick, Maine, and
NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii) to maintain 6 P-3 squadrons each.
Subsequent to the signing into law of the 1991 closure list,
COMPATWINGSPAC was rumored to have gained the support of CNAP
on a proposal to split the 18 remaining squadrons evenly
between East and West coasts, putting 9 at Barbers Point and
leaving 9 to split between NAS Jacksonville and NAS Brunswick.
The proposal subsequently did not receive approval at the CNO
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level, leaving the previous 6-squadron-per-station plan still
in effect [Ref. 11].
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III. BASE CLOSURE COSTS AND SAVINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a framework for identifying all of
the costs and savings associated with base closures. It
categorizes the costs and savings to the Defense Department
and the federal government using the Congressional Budget
Office guidelines for analysis of base closure costs in
Department of Defense Reports (Ref. 121.
The chapter is divided into ten sections, including this
Introduction. Section B provides an overview of the magnitude
of the costs and savings due to closing bases. It introduces
the concepts of one-time and recurring costs/savings.
Sections C through J provide descriptions of the specific
categories of costs and savings using the CBO guidelines
mentioned above. The final section (K) summarizes the chapter.
B. OVERVIEW
"It takes money to make money," and "there is no such
thing as a free lunch," are frequently quoted business adages.
Although they perhaps oversimplify, these phrases capture
succinctly the fundamental concept of closing military bases.
A relatively large one-time investment is required to close a
base before future savings can be achieved. The BRAC
Commission estimated the total one-time implementation costs
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for the 1988 round of base closures at $3.1 billion
[Ref. 13].
Lest these huge one-time costs deter the Department of
Defense from closing bases, Congress established the Base
Closure Account to provide the initial investment. The Base
Closure Account provides funds for military construction,
relocation expenses, environmental cleanup costs, and other
one-time costs that are incurred as a result of base closure.
The decision to appropriate funds specifically for base
closures appears prudent, since the military departments were
reluctant to use funds from already lean Operations and
Maintenance and Military Construction Appropriations to pay
the costs of closing bases. Providing separate funds earmarked
for base closure forced financial decisions and sped up the
process so that savings could be achieved sooner.
Although the Defense Department incurs many different
types of costs when it closes bases, a small number of these
types account for the vast majority of the total dollar
amount. Military construction and environmental cleanup costs
are the two largest one-time base closure costs, accounting
for over two-thirds of the total. The Operations category
includes several types of costs: severance pay and early
retirement pays for civilian employees, relocation costs, etc.
The sizable future savings that can be achieved by closing
bases justifies these substantial one time costs: The GAO
conservatively estimates that the 1988 base closures will save
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the Defense Department $453 million annually
[Ref. 14]. These recurring savings occur because the number
of civilian and military positions (and thus payroll costs)
Recurring Savings From Base Closures




Figure 1 Recurring Savings from BRAC-II.
and non-payroll overhead costs (such as utilities and
maintenance) are reduced.
As is the case with one-time costs, a few categories
account for the vast majority of the total dollar amount of
the recurring savings. Figure 1 illustrates the relative
magnitudes of the recurring savings from BRAC-II (the 1991
round of closures). Military and civilian payroll savings and
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overhead savings account for over 99 percent of the recurring
savings. 8
Not all of the savings from base closures recur annually;
some are "one-time" savings. "One-time" savings occur
whenever one-time costs that would occur if a base remained
open are avoided; for example, cancelling a programmed
military construction project at a closing base saves MILCON
funds. Throughout this chapter, savings are considered true
savings if they represent dollars eliminated from the Defense
Department Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), rather than
simply a shifting of expenses to another fiscal year or to
another facility.
C. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND SAVINGS
Military construction costs comprise a large share of the
one-time costs associated with base closures, accounting for
over $1.5 billion for the 1988 round of base closures.
Military construction may be required when closing a base
because before a base can be closed, its personnel, equipment,
and other mission essentials must be transferred to a
receiving base where the mission will be continued. If the
receiving base does not have excess building capacity in
suitable condition to support the personnel and equipment,
then a military construction project is funded. If excess
' The source of the data for Figure 2 was the 1993 Defense Department Budget
justification for BRAC 91.
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capacity exists, but in unsuitable condition, then military
construction funds are used to rehabilitate the facility. The
funds spent for new construction or rehabilitation are
considered a cost of base closure because they would not be
spent if the base were not closed.
Alternatively, closing a base may result in saving
military construction funds. When a base is chosen for
closure, the military construction projects programmed for the
base may no longer be needed and thus may be cancelled. The
funds that are not spent, net of any excess cost to terminate
contracts, represent savings to the Department of Defense.
These savings are attributed to the base closure action
because the funds would be spent if the base remained
operational.
D. REAL ESTATE COaTS AND REVENUES
Once a military base is closed and the land has been
restored to proper environmental standards, the real property
may be sold or leased to generate revenue. This revenue (net
of the costs to promote the sale) is applied to the Base
Closure Account and thus represents a one-time savings to the
Department of Defense. Early estimates of the land sales
proceeds for the twelve largest of the bases chosen for
closure in 1988 ranged from $1.0 to $1.35 billion.
Unfortunately, the large number of regulations governing
disposal of federal property and the continued slow pace of
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environmental cleanup have made the proceeds from land sales
very uncertain. The Navy has yet to realize any land sales
revenue from base closures, and estimates for the total
Defense Department proceeds from land sales from 1988 base
closures have been revised downward from $2.3 to $1.1 billion
[Ref. 15].
The Department of Defense has had to purchase land to
support some base closures. In these cases the receiving
bases did not have adequate land to support the personnel,
equipment and mission transferred from the closing base.
These purchases are a cost attributed to the base closure
ýrocess because they would not occur if the base were not
closed. These costs can be defined with much greater certainty
than the savings from land sales.
R. PIRSONNL COSTS AND SAVINGS
The lion's share of the recurring savings from base
closures comes from the elimination of military and civilian
positions. This is to be expected, because civilian labor
costs account for approximately 60 percent of the total cost
of operating a military base. In fact, for the 1988 round of
closures, personnel reductions account for 84 percent of the
$381 million in recurring savings to the Air Force
[Ref. 16]. Accurate prediction of the savings due to
personnel reductions is essential when estimating the total
savings a base closure will achieve.
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When the Defense Department closes or realigns military
bases, it eliminates some or all of the civilian and military
positions at the affected bases. The disposition of the
affected employees determines the amount of personnel costs
and savings due to the closure action. The Defense Department
may transfer civilians and military members to a receiving
base where the number of positions is increased. In this case
no savings are achieved because the number of employees and
therefore payroll costs have not decreased.
Alternatively, the Defense Department may choose not to
transfer civilian employees to new or previously existing
positions, removing them from the federal payroll using a
Reduction in Force (RIF). It may place the affected civilian
employees in another federal job as part of the Priority
Placement System. Some of the affected civilian employees may
choose early retirement or resign from their positions. In
these cases, savings can be achieved if no new employees are
hired to take their places, in other words, if the positions
are eliminated. The savings are attributed to the base
closure only if the positions are eliminated directly by the
closure action and not by some other mandated reduction in the
civilian work force.
In a like manner, the Defense Department may produce
recurring savings by reducing the number of military positions
when it closes or realigns bases. Again, the savings are
attributed to base closure only if the military positions are
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eliminated by the base closure action. Savings that accrue
when military positions are eliminated to meet goals for
planned military force reductions, even if concurrent with
base closings, do not count as base closure savings.
Closing bases involves personnel-related costs as well as
savings. The Department of Defense does not enjoy a "free
lunch" when it eliminates civilian or military positions. If
the civilian employees or military members affected by base
closing choose early retirement, then the Defense Department
must consider the marginal cost of providing early retirement
benefits as a base closure cost. If the Defense Department
uses a Reduction in Force to eliminate civilian positions,
then the severance pay it gives to fired employees is a base
closure cost. DOD may also be required to reimburse state
governments for the cost of unemployment compensation paid to
workers who lose their jobs when a base closes.
F. BASE OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COSTS AND SAVINGS
The base closure process generates other substantial
recurring savings by reducing the total overhead costs to
operate the military base structure. Military base operations
are supported by two separate funds, one for the maintenance
costs of real property and the other for non-payroll costs of
base operating support. When the Defense Department closes a
base, it sheds the costs to maintain the buildings and grounds
and to provide services to base personnel and tenant commands.
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Alternatively, the bases that receive the mission and
personnel from the closing base will see their overhead costs
rise. Net savings will occur if the base support funds saved
at the closing base are greater than the increase in costs at
the receiving bases. This is usually the case when the
receiving base has excess capacity and economies of scale can
be achieved.
The Department of Defense incurs other costs if the base
is deactivated9 (instead of closed) or if the closing process
is protracted. In either of these cases, Defense Department
pays caretakers to provide minimal maintenance for the grounds
and buildings until the properties are sold or reactivated.
G. RELOCATION COSTS
Although relocation costs are a relatively smaller portion
of the one-time costs of closing a base, they are not
insignificant. Before a base can be closed, the equipment
(aircraft, vehicles, and tools) and personnel must be
transferred to receiving bases where the activities will be
continued. The Defense Department pays for the packing,
unpacking, freight, and setup of transferred equipment. It
incurs additional costs when transferring specialized
equipment; for example, sophisticated laboratory equipment may
' When a base is deactivated, the activities are transferred to other bases and a
caretaker force is left in place to provide minimal maintenance and security. The lands are
not disposed of and the base can be reactivated if needed.
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require special handling and require expensive recalibration
after transfer.
Relocating civilian and military personnel involves
different types of costs. The Defense Department pays the
total permanent change of station (PCS) costs for all
civilian and military personnel transferred during the
closing process. However, since military members receive PCS
orders at regular intervals regardless of base closings, the
cost of the PCS moves that would have normally occurred during
the closure period should be excluded from base closure costs.
The Defense Department may be responsible for other costs
of transferring civilian employees. The Housing Assistance
Program provides payments to transferring federal employees
who stand to lose significant sums upon sale of their homes
because of depressed housing prices"°. These payments are a
cost of base closure because they would not be made if the
affected military base remained operational.
"Section 1013 of Public Law 89-754 authorizes the Defense Secretary to provide
financial help to eligible homeowners serving at installations that are ordered closed or
realigned. The law permits benefits if property decreases in value as a result of a closure
announcement and cannot be sold on "reasonable terms." The program allows recoupment
of up to 95 percent of the pre-closure fair market value of the property.
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H. ZNVIROMIZNTAL CLIANUP COSTS
The cost of environmental cleanup at closing bases
continues to skyrocket. The military department estimates of
the cleanup costs for the bases chosen in 1988 have climbed
from $510 to $859 million [Ref. 17]. Experience with
the 1988 closures shows that cost estimates increase
significantly (sometimes by a factor of ten) after the
detailed studies and ground tests are complete. Pease Air
Force Base is representative of this trend:
... the preliminary environmental cleanup estimate was $11
million. In fiscal year 1992, the Air Force increased the
estimated cleanup to over $63 million and to over $102
million in fiscal year 1993 when it had the benefit of
studies and tests that were not previously available. By
December 1992, the estimate had increased to over $114
million.
If the trend continues, the cleanup costs for the 1991 and
1993 rounds, currently estimated at $2.7 billion, will become
monumental [Ref. 18].
Since 1991 the Base Closure Account has provided the funds
for environmental restoration of closing bases; however, the
Defense Department and reviewing agencies have not considered
these restoration costs as "base closure costs" per se. The
current policy of the Defense Department is that environmental
cleanup costs should not be a factor in the base closure
decision process; it excludes these costs from its net present
value analyses. The Defense Department believes environmental
restoration costs are sunk costs since public law requires
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Defense Department to clean up the bases whether or not they
are closed".
Although the Defense Department is required to clean up
bases regardless of closure decisions, the enormous costs of
cleanup may in the short term "squeeze out" defense spending
in other areas. GAO predicts that environmental cleanup costs
will have "significant budgetary impact since pressure for
rapid conversion and reutilization of closed bases will not
allow these costs to be spread over many years"
[Ref. 19]. T he opportunities that the Defense
Department forgoes to redirect its funds to accelerate
environmental cleanup have some value or cost that should be
recognized as part of base closure decision.
1. HEALTH COSTS
When the Defense Department closes medical facilities at
a base, the retirees and dependents who previously used these
facilities and remain in the area must use civilian health
care facilities. This increases the costs to the Civilian
Health and Medical Plan of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)
and to Medicare. However, if medical facilities are expanded
at a receiving base during the closure process, more retirees
and dependents in that locale may be able to receive care at
"The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (Public Law 96-510) and Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(Public Law 99-499) require the Defense Department to restore contaminated sites.
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Defense Department facilities. This reduces CHAMPUS and
Medicare costs to tht! federal government, and reduces the net
increase in health care costs due to base closings.
J. ECONOMIC GRANTS
The federal government has provided substantial financial
assistance to the communities affected by base closures
[Ref. 20]. From 1966 through 1987, federal agencies
provided $963 million (in 1988 dollars) in assistance to
communities affected by base closure or realignment;
however, it is hard to estimate the amount of economic aid
that will be available in the future. When asked how much
funding they could provide to communities affected by the base
closures in 1988, agency heads stated that "substantially
smaller amounts" of funds were available [Ref. 21].
Although it may be difficult to estimate the amounts of these
grants, they are still a cost of base closure.
K. SUMMARY
In summary, closing military bases requires a relatively
large one-time investment in order to achieve future savings.
Two categories of costs, military construction and
environmental cleanup costs, account for the majority of this
large initial investment; however, large potential recurring
saviIngs may justify the initial costs. As was the case with
the initial or one-time costs, a few categories account for
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nearly all of the recurring savings. Military and civilian
salary savings and non-payroll overhead savings make up over
99 percent of the recurring savings. Thus the accurate
estimation of these few categories of costs and savings is
crucial if the Defense Department is to make sound financial
decisions as it closes bases.
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IV. REALIGNMENT SCENARIO COMPARISON
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents Military Construction (MILCON) cost
data for the various P-3 realignment plans that are being or
have been considered. As stated in the last chapter,
Environmental clean-up and MILCON costs are the two largest
one-time closure costs, accounting for over two-thirds of the
total. The Defense Department considers environmental
restoration costs as sunk, however, since public law requires
the eventual clean-up of all facilities regardless of closure
status. For this reason MILCON costs are generally considered
the best yardstick of initial closure cost for each
realignment alternative, and are presented in this chapter in
table format for each P-3 realignment option. Appendix A
presents a brief description and justification for each MILCON
project requirement specified in the enclosed tables.
This chapter consists of eight sections, beginning with
this introduction. Section B gives an overview of the 1993
BRAC decisions regarding the involved facilities. Sections C
and D give the MCAS Kaneohe Bay and NAS Whidbey Island
justifications for receiver site selection. Sections E through
H present the MILCON cost Data for the Realignment scenario
options. Section J summarizes the data.
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S. 1993 BRAC FINDINGS
The Navy Department made significant advances toward
ensuring their process was well documented throughout the 1993
deliberations, and that recommendations were well founded and
supportable. This was intended to prevent the kind of
embarrassments experienced during the 1991 round of base
closures.
By early 1993, new cuts in Defense funding prompted a
decrease in the P-3 force structure from 18 to 16 squadrons.
This fact, combined with an assumed future decrease in USMC
end strength to 159,000, led to P-3 relocation scenarios that
involved MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, as a receiver site. One of
many scenario data calls executed by the BSEC requested cost
figures for movement of P-3 squadrons from NAS Barbers Point
and NAS Moffett Field to MCAS Kaneohe Bay and NAS Whidbey
Island. Eight West coast P-3 squadrons would be split between
the two sites.
NAS Barbers Point was indeed selected for closure by the
1993 BRAC commission, with West coast receiver sites
identified as MCAS Kaneohe Bay and NAS Whidbey Island. NAS
Whidbey Island would receive two P-3 squadrons from NAS
Barbers Point and two additional squadrons from NAS Moffett
field, which was slated for closure by BRAC 91. The remaining
four P-3 squadrons at Barbers Point would relocate to Kaneohe
Bay. The official closure of Barbers Point would be complete
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by the end of FY 96, contingent upon completion of appropriate
MILCON at receiver sites. The Coast Guard facility at Barbers
Point was also set to relocate to Kaneohe Bay in FY 96',
however, efforts to keep the Coast Guard at Barbers Point are
being explored pending airfield-community-reuse-planning
decisions. All Barbers Point Family housing units will remain
for multi-service use under the control of COMNAVBASE Pearl
Harbor. Appropriate Quality-of-life facilities such as
Commissary, Exchange, and Medical Clinic will also be
retained to support the remaining 10,000 military residents in
the Barbers Point area.
C. MCAS KANEOHE SAY JUSTIFICATION
Table I PACFLT AIR STATION CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS
AIR STATION MV-MV Avg Apron Cap. Hangar Cap.
NAS Whidbey Island 18.06 459 683
MCAS Kaneohe Bay 10.15 164 177
NAS Miramar 6.26 591 859
NAS Lemoore 4.70 435 645
NAS North Island 2.69 552 626
NAS Barbers Point 1.33 533 533
MCAS CP Pendleton -1.13 251 216
MCAS El Toro -7.88 579 378
NAS Alameda -15.27 535 1430
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NAS Barbers Point was recommended for closure by the BRAC
Commission because its capacity was judged to be excess to
that required to support the reduced force levels contained in
the Defense Department force structure plan. The analysis of
required capacity supported only one Naval Air Station in
Hawaii. NAS Barbers Point had lower military value (Table
I) 12 and a greater ground encroachment problem than MCAS
Kaneohe Bay, and its assets could also be readily
redistributed to other existing Naval Air Stations
[Ref. 22].
By maintaining operations at MCAS Kaneohe Bay, the Defense
Department retained the additional capacity that the station
provides in supporting ground forces. Given the uncertainties
of future overseas basing, the Commission felt that MCAS
Kaneohe Bay would provide a flexibility to support future Navy
and Marine Corps operations. The BRAC Commission recommended
the relocation of F-18 and helicopter squadrons from MCAS
Kaneohe Bay to other West coast facilities in order to
"create" the required capacity at Kaneohe Bay. The BRAC
Commission recommendation was signed into law by the President
in September of 1993.
12(MV-MV AVG) refers to the difference of the station Military Value score and the
overall average Military Value for all operational air stations.
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D. HAS WHIDDRY ISLAND JUSTIFICATION
NAS Whidbey Island was judged to be an ideal receiver site
for the patrol squadrons due to facilities and hangar space
capacity and training area availability. Geographically, NAS
Whidbey Island is located in close proximity to several key
ASW facilities in the Puget Sound area, all of which would
mutually benefit from the presence of operational patrol
squadrons. P-3 aircraft based at Whidbey would be able to
operate and train with the Trident class submarines based 40
miles away at Banghor submarine base. They would also interact
and train with the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division
(NUWCD) at Keyport, WA. Currently, Whidbey based SH-3 SAR
helicopters drop various undersea mines and torpedoes for
NUWCD at the Nanoose mining range in British Columbia, Canada.
The Nanoose range is one of the finest acoustically scored
ranges in the world. Nanoose, in conjunction with the
Admiralty bay mining range ten miles south of NAS Whidbey
provides an outstanding complex of scored weapons ranges at
which P-3 aircrew can train to their missions.
Also of great importance to the ASW capability of P-3's at
Whidbey Island is the strategic location of the Naval Facility
(NAVFAC) located on the air station. VP mission debrief
facilities already exist on station, and the addition of a
mobile ASWOC unit would complement the capabilities offered by
the NAVFAC.
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In this scenario there is an excess of hangar and ramp
space at Whidbey Island due to the retirement of A-6
squadrons. Additional building space would not be required for
the P-3 simulators as there would be room in existing A-6
simulator facilities. AIMD support would require minimal
modification to handle the P-3 update III equipment, with no
additional MILCON required.
R. SCENARIO "A"
Initial planning for BRAC 93 called for the transfer of
all Marine Corps aviation assets of the Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) from MCAS Kaneohe Bay to other bases, while the
ground forces would remain [Ref. 23]. Under this
initial scenario the eight West coast squadrons would have
been split evenly between NAS Whidbey Island and MCAS Kaneohe
Bay giving an estimated BRAC supported facilities cost of $92
million. The relocation of the 36 helicopters and 24 F/A-18
aircraft from Kaneohe Bay assumed by the BRAC would create
sufficient capacity to keep MILCON costs relatively low for
this option. The low MILCON requirements also supported the
preliminary Barbers Point closure date of September 30, 1996.
F. SCENARIO 3DN
The initial scenario presented above was short-lived,
however, due to its failure to recognize the synergistic
relationship of the air assets and the ground combat forces of
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the MAGTF. The MAGTF trains and operates the helicopter and
ground combat elements as one unit and must co-locate these
forces. Since the ground combat element -as never slated to
move, the Marine Corps decided to retain a "tailored" MAGTF
force structure at MCAS Kaneohe Bay. The Marine Corps would be
able to reduce the required MAGTF force structure by reducing
the Air Combat Element (ACE) requirement to the helicopter
assets already on station. The two medium and one heavy lift
helicopter squadrons of MAG-24 would remain while the F/A-18
squadrons (along with any associated support) would be
relocated elsewhere [Ref. 24).
This issue is directly related to the MAGTF concept and is
not a function of the Marine Corps end strength control at the
time of budget submission of 159,000. The Marine Corps view of
its capability requirements is based on CINC mission
requirements in three theaters. That mission is to furnish
PACCOM, CENTCOM, and KOREA a reservoir of capability-based
forces from which to provide a wide range of expert low to mid
intensity contingency capabilities as well as large, task-
organized forces of combined arms for theater level high
intensity warfare. One of the keys to accomplishing this
mission is preserving a MAGTF in the mid-Pacific
(Ref. 25].
As a result of the P-3 force structure decisions and the
Marine Corps decision to retain helicopter units of the MAGTF
at Kaneohe Bay, additional MILCON requirements were identified
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Table II SCENARIO B MILCON PROJECTS
Project BASE FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 TOTAL
P-287T Helo Pad KB 610
P-539T Util Recon KB 2300
P-538T PWC Shop KB 6700
P-507T Ord Facil KB 5600
P-284T USCG Facil KB 25000
P-506T TELCOMM KB 2400
P-276T P-3 OFT KB 4200
P-269T Wash Rack KB 1200
P-268T A/C Apron KB 29300
P-270T A/C HGR KB 24500
P-272T AIMD Facil KB 9400
P-273T Ord Facil KB 4700
P-280T POL Move KB 1000
P-285T Rehab Admin KB 2100
P-261T CONSOL Fac KB 6500
P-271T Rehab CPWP KB 2050
P-274T Av Supply KB 15800
to generate the capacity at Kaneohe Bay for the P-3 units
from NAS Barbers Point. The MILCON requirements for this
option are detailed in Tables II and III for NAS Whidbey
Island and MCAS Kaneohe Bay. Total MILCON cost for this option
is estimated at over $254 million (Ref. 26].
55
Table III SCENARIO B MILCON PROJECTS (continued)
Project Base FY 95 FY96 FY97 .,OTAL
P-277T Alter APTU KB 680
P-286T BQ Facil KB 21400
P-288T AMM Sites KB 2900
P-289T Applied Ins KB 2200
P-291T EDF Renov KB 880
P-500T Clubs Add KB 6400
P-501T Exchange KB 4700
P-502T Med/Dent KB 2700
P-503T Recr Fac KB 32500
P-504T Util Upgr KB 9100
P-505T A/C OPS Fac KB 5900
MCAS K-Bay Total 232720 232720
P-603T Apron Rehab WI 4500
P-604T TSC WI 8300
P-605T FLT SIM WI 2700
P-608T HGR Rehab WI 3150
P-612T Eng Shop WI 3320
NAS Whidbey Total 21970 21970
G. SCENARIO "C"
Late Summer of 1993 brought further cuts in Defense
funding and a reduction in P-3 force structure from 16 to 13
squadrons. Seven squadrons would be split between NAS
Brunswick and NAS Jacksonville on the East coast, while six
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squadrons would be stationed on the West coast. Continued
concerns over funding levels led to P-3 realignment scenarios
that proposed single-siting all six west coast squadrons at
NAS Whidbey Island. This option would save extensive
construction costs (Table IV)13.
Under this current plan, the two squadrons that have
already relocated to NAS Whidbey Island from Moffett Field
will be joined by four squadrons from NAS Barbers Point along
with COMPATWINGSPAC. The two remaining squadrons at NAS
Barbers Point will be disestablished as part of the
downsizing. The Executive Transport Department (ETD), HSL-37,
and the Coast Guard Air Station will move from Barbers Point
to Kaneohe Bay and will require MILCON for Hangar alterations,
a helicopter pad, and ordnance and supply facilities. These
requirements were reduced in September, 1993, due to a further
reduction in MAGTF ACE requirements from one heavy and two
medium lift helicopter squadrons to two tailored heavy lift
squadrons. The two tailored squadrons would contain 8 CH-53D
aircraft each. This proposal would reduce the USMC air asset
loading at Kaneohe Bay from 36 to 16 helicopters. The ACE
requirement was subsequently upgraded by the Marine Corps to
10 CH-53D's per squadron [Ref. 27].
"Several projects originally part of the scenario C project list did not survive the
Navcompt review process. These now unfunded projects are P-601T, P-606T, P-607T, P-
613T, P-617T, and P-620T.
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Prior to the acceptance of the single site plan there
were significant MILCON-funding reductions. The NAVCOMPT
marked BRAC construction budget of $32.11 million for Kaneohe
Bay was the catalyst for the acceptance of the scenario C
plan. Additionally, the deferral of the P-3 Tactical Support
Center (TSC) project funding to FY 95 and other receiver site
MILCON to FY 96/97 will significantly impact the speed of
implementation of the single site plan. The NAVCOMPT marks
will cause the closure of the station to slide to late FY 98
and have essentially frozen the Whidbey single siting effort
following the arrival of the two Moffett squadrons. Without
the TSC the squadrons will be operating like remotely deployed
units and will be limited with regard to real world tactical
and training support.
The slide in the Barbers Point closure date seems
inevitable regardless of efforts to accommodate the move.
Assuming that initial funds won't be available until December
of 1995 and using the two-year construction rule of thumb, few
of the facilities at Whidbey Island or Kaneohe Bay will be
usable until January of 1998. Allowing several months to move
forces and assets results in the late FY 98 Barbers Point
closure date. The total MILCON cost for this option is
estimated at $74 million.
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Table IV SCENARIO C MILCON PROJECTS
Project Base FY 95 FY96 FY97 TOTAL
P-269 Wash Rack KB 1300
P-539T Util Recon KB 2800
P-538T PWC Shop KB 6100
P-270T HGR Mod KB 13100
P-294T Coast Guard KB 11900
P-273T Ord Fac KB 4700
P-274T Av Supply KB 300
P-287T Helo Pad KB 1250
P-508T Ord Facil KB 2800
MCAS K-Bay Total 39550 39550
P-603T Apron Rehab WI 4500
P-604T TSC WI 7000
P-605T FLT SIM WI 4920
P-608T HGR Rehab WI 3150
P-612T Eng Shop WI 5850
P-616T CPWP HQ WI 1600
P-600T GSE Shop WI 5600
P-615T Sono Stor WI 1860
HAS Whidbey Total 1 25020 7460 34480
H. SCENARIO "D"
Scenario D is a fallback plan to the single site effort
that calls for locating 3 P-3 squadrons each at NAS Whidbey
and MCAS Kaneohe Bay. It should be noted here that the new
Navy aircraft loading for Scenario D has been increased from
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8 to 9 P-3's per squadron. The ETD and HSL squadron would also
move to Kaneoh! Bay under this plan. This option originated
from CINCPACFLT tasking to the Commander, Pacific Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (PACNAVFACENGCOM) in
December, 1993. The tasking directed PACNAVFACENGCOM to
conduct a study of scenario C and D MILCON requirements. The
study was initiated by CINCPACFLT due to the NAVCOMPT marked
BRAC construction budget and the reduction in MAGTF ACE
requirements at Kaneohe Bay.
From the preliminary estimates contained in Table V and
VI, it is clear that this option will result in a large
increase in initial cost over scenario C. The projects are
basically the same as scenario B, with revisions to reflect
the new Navy and Marine Corps loadings and Commanding Officer
recommendations. Supporting MWR facility requirements which
qualified for BRAC funding were screened by the facility CO's
during the final joint brief in February, 1994. It was agreed
at that time to delete certain MWR projects that were not
required and/or not defendable. These deleted requirements
resulted in a savings of $29.8 million"4 .
What is not now clear is what compromises and adjustments
will come out of the political maneuvering that will surely
take place over this issue between now and BRAC 95. Future
budget reductions, updated force structure requirements, and
"Deleted projects include P-289T, P-291T, P-500T, P-501T, and part of P-503T.
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BRAC construction budget and the reduction in MAGTF ACE
requirements at Kaneohe Bay.
From the preliminary estimates contained in Table V and
VI, it is clear that this option will result in a large
increase in initial cost over scenario C. The projects are
basically the same as scenario B, with revisions to reflect
Table VI SCENARIO D MILCON PROJECTS (continued)
Project Base FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 TOTAL
P-603T Apron Rehab WI 4500
P-604T TSC WI 8300
P-605T FLT SIM WI 2700
P-608T HGR Rehab WI 3150
P-612T Eng Shop WI 3320
NAS Whidbey Total 21970 21970
the new Navy and Marine Corps loadings and Commanding Officer
recommendations. Supporting MWR facility requirements which
qualified for BRAC funding were screened by the facility CO's
during the final joint brief in February, 1994. It was agreed
at that time to delete certain MWR projects that were not
required and/or not defendable. These deleted requirements
resulted in a savings of $29.8 million14 .
"Deleted projects include P-289T, P-291T, P-500T, P-501T, and part of P-503T.
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What is not now clear is what compromises and adjustments
will come out of the political maneuvering that will surely
take place over this issue between now and BRAC 95. Future
budget reductions, updated force structure requirements, and
political compromises will all play into the final decision.
The total cost for this option is estimated at $198 million.
1. SUNQARY
In summary, the initial scenario delineated in the BRAC
closure report called for the relocation of West Coast P-3
squadrons to MCAS Kaneohe Bay and NAS Whidbey Island. Capacity
would be created at Kaneohe Bay by moving all Marine Corps
aviation assets of the MAGTF ACE to other West Coast air
stations. The ACE relocation and the decommissioning of A-6
squadrons at NAS Whidbey Island would give sufficient excess
capacity at both locations and avoid excessive MILCON cost
($92 million total). The USMC decision to retain a partial ACE
at Kaneohe Bay led to a significant increase in MILCON
requirements ($254 million total). This increase in cost and
the subsequent decrease in P-3 force structure prompted the
current NAS Whidbey Island single site plan. This plan calls
for NAS Whidbey to be home to all 6 West coast P-3 squadrons
and would result in substantial savings. While this is the
lowest cost option put forth to date ($74 million total),
other options are being investigated. The most likely
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compromise to be considered would be a 3/3 squadron split
between MCAS Kaneohe Bay and NAS Whidbey Island that has a
projected MILCON cost of $198 million. The final decision will
likely not be made until after the 1995 BRAC deliberations
have concluded. The conclusions that flow from these cost
figure findings and the possible areas for further research
are included in the next chapter.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and
draws conclusions on the effect of budget reductions on
military force structure realignment. The chapter is divided
into four sections, including this introduction. Section B
summarizes the study, reviewing the major points of the
previous chapters. Section C presents conclusions based on the
findings of the study. Section D provides suggestions for
further research regarding the base closure and realignment
process.
B. SUNlARY
Chapter I reviewed the changes in the political and fiscal
environments that led to formation of the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission. It introduced the P-3 realignment scenario
that would be analyzed in order to form conclusions on the
effect of budget reductions on force structure realignment.
Chapter II presented a history of the base closure process
and the BRAC findings involving the air stations related to
this realignment. It reviewed the history of events that led
to the creation of the BRAC Commission in 1988, then provided
an overview of the BRAC selection process and criteria, and
described the make up of the Commission. The Navy's closure
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candidate selection process and the role of GAO were then
summarized, followed by a review of the aircraft types
affected by this realignment. Finally, the 1991 BRAC findings
for NAS Whidbey Island and MCAS Kaneohe Bay were summarized.
Chapter III described the costs and savings associated
with the closure and realignment of military facilities. It
was shown that closing bases requires a large one-time
investment, but that the sizable future savings justify this
initial investment. Military construction (MILCON) and
environmental cleanup are by far the largest up-front costs of
closure. The environmental cleanup costs, however, are not
considered true closure costs given that all facilities must
be cleaned up eventually, regardless of closure status.
Military construction costs then make up the lion's share of
incremental-one-time costs of base closure. The savings are
primarily from the elimination of military and civilian
positions, and the reduction of overhead expenses, which are
predicted to account for 75 and 24 percent of future savings,
respectively. It also discussed the large overestimation of
revenue from property disposal which is due primarily to
skyrocketing environmental clean-up costs.
Chapter IV presented MILCON cost data for the various P-3
realignment options. MILCON data was used due to it being the
largest up-front-marginal cost incurred when closing or
realigning bases. The chapter first presented an overview of
the 1993 BRAC decisions regarding Whidbey Island and Kaneohe
65
Bay, then ic reviewed the justifications for their selection
as receiver sites. The initial scenario delineated in the 1993
BRAC report called for splitting eight West coast P-3
squadrons between Whidbey Island and Kaneohe Bay. The capacity
was to be created at Kaneohe by relocating all air assets of
the MAGTF from Kaneohe to other locations. The USMC decision
to retain a partial ACE complement of helicopters at Kaneohe
Bay resulted in a sharp increase in MILCON cost. This increase
in cost and subsequent decrease in P-3 force structure were
the catalysts for the acceptance of the Whidbey Island single-
site option (scenario C). There is also a plan being studied
(scenario D) that would split the six West coast squadrons
between Kaneohe and Whidbey, but with a significant increase
in MILCON cost.
C. CONCLUSIONS
1. Least Cost Scenario
The cuts in BRAC related MILCON funding and the
decrease in P-3 force structure requirements led to the
acceptance of the NAS Whidbey Island single site plan. This
plan uses the excess capa created at Whidbey by the
decommissioning of A-6 squadions to phase in all six West
coast squadrons. This plan saves over $120 million when
compar-d to the scenario D plan that is also being studied.
This single site plan is the most efficient use of operational
NAS capacity and appears to result in no strategic sacrifices
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when compared to the scenario D plan. While much more
expensive initially, the D option would, however, leave more
air station excess capacity available for detachment
capability and future military ramp-ups.
2. Longer Closure Process
The BRAC 93 closure plan contains several complex,
time-sensitive, daisy chain closures and realignments. The
MILCON funding reductions jeopardize the accomplishment of
critical closures/realignments within the six-year time period
required by law. The Secretary of Defense and Department of
the Navy support the concept of rapid, efficient closures so
as to minimize the impact on local communities and to realize
savings as soon as possible.
With the deferral of MILCON funding supporting the
Barbers Point closure until FY 96/97, the closure of the
station will likely slide well into FY 98. Assuming that the
initial funds won't be available until December 1995 and using
the two-year construction rule of thumb, few of the facilities
at Kaneohe or Whidbey will be usable until December of 1997.
At a minimum, movement of the Executive Transport Department
(ETD), HSL-37, and the Coast Guard from Barbers Point cannot
begin until the hangar alterations, Helo pad, ordnance and
supply facilities, and AIMD alterations are completed at
Kaneohe Bay. Allowing several months to move these forces and
assets will mean shutting down Barbers sometime in late FY 98.
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a. Higher OI Coome
The resulting effect of the MILCON reductions is
to delay operational closures and to increase costs to
maintain the facilities for an additional 1-2 years. Costs to
the O&M and personnel accounts to keep facilities open longer
than the current BRAC 93 plan envisioned could exceed $1
billion. Additional costs can also be expected from the
inflationary impact to construction projects and potential
duplication of operation costs to simultaneously maintain two
or more bases and pay salaries as transition/realignments are
drawn out. It is unclear at this time whether the MILCON
savings will outweigh the increase in OMN costs due to the
resulting delays in the closure process.
b. Reduced MiaaIon Zffectiveneaa
With the two Moffett squadrons in place at NAS
Whidbey Island, the MILCON deferral has frozen the single
siting effort. The deferral of the TSC funding has created a
situation where the Whidbey squadrons are operating like
remotely deployed units, with limited real-world tactical and
training support. Until the TSC is brought on line, the Navy
is forced to maintain two VP sites which require duplicate
support and could adversely impact the readiness of the
Whidbey based P-3 squadrons. The longer the squadrons operate
in this manner, the more likely that the tactical proficiency
of the aircrew will decrease.
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3. Adverse Community Impact
Until the Barbers Point closure date issue, along with
the single site final determination is resolved, many
incorrect and false expectations are being generated within
the local communities. The consequences of not finalizing
these issues and keeping the interest groups uninformed could
lead to detrimental working relationships as local community
plans become inexecutable. An extended closure combined with
the cleanup process may agitate the local population given the
Defense Secretary's commitment to minimizing impact on
communities.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Analysis of the effect of budget reductions on force
structure realignment suggests that the following issues and
research tasks are worthy of further attention.
" Determine if there is sufficient excess capacity at NAS
Whidbey Island for 3 P-3 squadrons and the EF-111 fleet
from Mountain Home AFB. If so, assess the efficiency of
implementing scenario D in conjunction with the EF-111
relocation. Significant benefits could be gained from the
joint electronic training and operations of USAF EF-III's
and USN EA-6B's
"• Analyze the impact of the BRAC MILCON deferrals on the
tactical proficiency of the two P-3 squadrons that have
already relocated to NAS Whidbey Island. Funding for the
TSC and other training and support functions has been
deferred 1-2 years and the impact of this delay on
readiness needs to be assessed.
"* Assess the impact of the elimination of excess capacity in
the Navy's base structure. Will the loss of excess
capacity eliminate the "surge" capability that may be
needed in the future.
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* Conduc- a cost benefit analysis on the BRAC MILCON funding
deferral for the P-3 relocation. The funding cuts result
in an increase in OMN costs to support the bases whose
closure date has been delayed.
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APPENDIX
A. WCAS KANZOHZ BAY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
1. P-261T Consolidated Training Facility
This project calls for the construction of a two story
metal or concrete masonry building with reinforced concrete
floor slab and built up roofing. This training facility will
provide on station, academic classroom and laboratory type
technical training for the Naval Maintenance Training Group
Detachment (NAMTRAGRUDET), and Fleet Aviation Maintenance
Program (FRAMP). NAMTRAGRUDET and FRAMP provide formal
aviation maintenance training to pilots, aircrew, and
maintenance personnel to maintain and operate the P-3
aircraft.
2. P-268T Aircraft Parking Apron
The existing MCAS Kaneohe Bay aircraft apron pavement
is presently designed for Kaneohe's primary aircraft, the F/A-
18 Hornet. The apron does not meet design strength
requirements for the P-3 aircraft and must be strengthened to
accommodate the P-3 wheel loads. The pavement has been in
service for some time and repair requirements are backlogged
due to the lack of O&M funds. The accomplishment of the
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repairs, however, will not allow operation of the heavier P-3
loads as it would only include work needed to meet the current
F/A-18 mission requirements. This project specifically
involves the strengthening of the pavement required to
accommodate the P-3 mission. This will avoid rapid pavement
failure and consequent damage to aircraft.
3. P-269T Modify Aircraft Wash & Rinse
The existing MCAS Kaneohe Bay rinse facility is
designed for F/A-18 Hornets and is essentially comprised of a
concrete slab, floor mounted spray nozzles with a pump and
drainage system. The P-3 is a much larger and taller aircraft
than the F/A-18 and cannot be serviced by the existing rinse
facility without major modifications. This project will
provide a spray-up rinserack for the P-3s by installing spray
racks and additional pavement, modifying water pumps, holding
tanks, and the oil-water separator, and increasing the rinse
facility taxiway radii. Similarly, the project will modify the
wash facility by strengthening/enlarging the pavement and
modifying drainage to accommodate P-3s.
4. P-270T Alter Aircraft Hangars
The existing hangars at MCAS Kaneohe Bay reserved for
the Navy P-3 aircraft are substandard in that they lack fire
protection systems and adequate lighting in the hanga- bays
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ane shop/administrative spaces. The Marines presently risk
using these facilities that do not conform to fire codes and
marginally utilize them for aviation supply storage and hangar
space. Fire safety codes require the provision of minimum fire
protection systems whenever a building is modified or
renovated. The hangars will also require modification of
entrances to allow the larger P-3 aircraft to be fully housed.
The tail height of the P-3 is over 34 feet while the hangar
door is only 28 feet tall. Other hangar module spaces will be
renovated to meet crew and equipment and administrative space
requirements that do not exist. This project proposes to
renovate 168,000 SF (the Navy hangar requirement) in order to
provide safe and adequate facilities for Navy use. The balance
of the spaces will remain substandard to conform with BRAC
guidance.
5. P-271T Rehab COMPATWINGPAC
This project calls for the renovation of former
research, laboratory, and storage buildings at Kaneohe Bay to
accommodate COMPATWINGSPAC administration. Existing buildings
will be renovated to provide administrative, conference,
vault, and associated administrative spaces. MCAS Kaneohe Bay
currently does not currently have sufficient administrative
office space to accommodate CPWP headquarters. The buildings
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proposed for renovation were formerly occupied by Naval
Oceanographic Research personnel.
6. P-272T Alter AIWD Facilities
This renovation work is compelled by the expansion of
the existing Ground Support Equipment (GSE) holding shed to
meet requirements. The GSE holding shed expansion in the joint
shop/shed compound will displace existing shop space which is
the station motor pool area. The motor pool will be relocated
to a former flight simulator facility. The 3600 SF facility
requires renovation in order to convert it to administrative
support space.
7. P-273T Ordnance Facilities
This project calls for the construction of ordnance
facilities to accommodate the P-3 squadrons at Kaneohe Bay.
Project work includes construction of an air/underwater
weapons (AUW) shop and storage facility, an above-ground box
ready magazine, and ar earth-covered missile magazine. The
project also includes the relocation of a simulated carrier
deck displaced by the construction. There are currently no
suitable existing assets available at Kaneohe Bay to satisfy
these requirements.
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8. P-274T Aviation Supply
This projects calls for the construction of aviation
supply facilities at Kaneohe Bay to accommodate the P-3
squadrons from Barbers Point. The project calls for the
construction of a Navy supply facility and a Marine Corps
storage facility which will be displaced from hangars 102 and
103. Kaneohe Bay does not currently have adequate supply
facilities to support the P-3 squadrons.
9. P-276T Operational Trainer Facility
The NAVFAC P-80 Basic Facility Requirement (BFR)
criteria for operational training facility requires 37,000 SF
(square feet) for four VP squadrons and one HSL squadron.
Although this project provides for only half of the
requirement, the NAS Barbers Point Operational Training is
performed in the existing 15,983 SF permanent facility. The
project was to be developed in this way so as to be in
accordance with BRAC guidance which states that project scope
will be the lesser of BFR and existing assets at the closing
site(s). This guidance specifically prohibits execution of
construction projects to "get well". Therefore the project
scope replaces only existing assets of 15,983 SF. In addition,
there are no existing facilities at MCAS Kaneohe Bay that can
readily accommodate the special construction needs (high
ceilings, raised flooring, etc) required to support the flight
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simulator and trainer units. Construction of facilities equal
to existing assets will allow training to continue at existing
levels.
10. P-277T Alter APTU
This project calls for the renovation of former
research facilities at Kaneohe Bay to accommodate the Navy
Aviation Physiology Training Unit. The project will renovate
an existing building to provide administrative and classroom
spaces, and modify an existing research tank for water
survival training. The APTU provides physiological and water
survival training to the local aviation community.
11. P-280T Relocate POL
This project calls for the modification of the
existing aircraft refueling station at Kaneohe Bay to
accommodate the P-3 aircraft from Barbers Point. Kaneohe Bay
does not have adequate direct refueling facilities to
accommodate the P-3 squadrons. Existing facilities are
designed for the smaller Marine jet aircraft and are
unsuitable for the P-3 air-raft. Adequate direct fueling
capability for 2 P-3 aircraft is required.
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12. P-284T Coast Guard Facilities
The Coast Guard has provided considerable study
information that concludes that the most economic alternative
is to move their operation to MCAS Kaneohe Bay. They
considered the $2 million to $3 million cost of operating the
runway at Barbers Point and alternative sites such as Hickam
AFB. The cost of operations,additional construction, and
limitations on mission for the other sites prompted inclusion
of this project. The Coast Guard could remain as a tenant at
NAS Barbers Point if plans are carried out to convert it to a
civilian airfield. The state of Hawaii, however, has given no
guarantees that Barbers Point will remain as an airfield and
has discussed alternative uses such as housing, a college
campus, and industrial parks. This project includes an
aircraft hangar, supporting shops, administrative space,
aircraft apron and taxiway, enlisted bachelor quarters, and
replacement of a displaced helicopter rinse facility.
13. P-285T Rehab Administrative Spaces
This project calls for the renovation of 38000 square
feet of administrative office space and an 1100 square foot
data processing center. This space is needed to accommodate
the incoming P-3 support staff at Kaneohe Bay due to the
current lack of adequate administrative office space at the
MCAS.
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14. P-286T Alter BQ
This project calls for the renovation of an existing
open bay barrack space to accommodate 377 enlisted personnel
and construction of a six story facility to accommodate 100
officers. The project also calls for the renovation of an open
bay barrack space for a discipline barracks. This project is
required due to a current lack of adequate billeting
facilities at Kaneohe Bay.
15. P-287T Helicopter Landing Pad
This plan calls for the construction of a landing pad
for the helicopter anti-submarine squadron (HSL-37) relocating
to Kaneohe Bay. The pad will include lighting and
appurtenances for night and training landings. Kaneohe Bay
does not currently have sufficient helicopter landing pads to
accommodate the Navy helicopters.
16. P-288T HH/HZ Aitcum Sites
This project calls for the construction of a hazardous
and flammable materials storehouse and an operational storage
facility on sites which are currently vacant and compatible
with the long range land use plan. There are currently no
suitable existing facilities available for this use.
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17. P-289T Applied Instruction Building
This project proposes the construction of a one-story
concrete masonry applied instruction building. The facility is
required in order to adequately train and support the
operation of the P-3 units from Barbers Point. The project
includes air-conditioning, fire-protection, and utility
connections. There are no suitable existing assets at MCAS
Kaneohe Bay.
18. P-291T Renovate ZDF
This project calls for the renovation of an existing
facility to support the dining requirements of the Naval
aviation units relocating from Barbers Point. Kaneohe Bay does
not currently have adequate dining facilities to accommodate
the additional Navy personnel. Without this facility the air
station will not be able to provide adequate dining facilities
to its personnel, and quality of life will be degraded.
19. P-294T Coast Guard
This project calls for the alteration of existing
aircraft facilities to accommodate the Coast Guard unit
relocating from Barbers Point. Hangar 104 can be modified to
satisfy the Coast Guard maintenance hangar and support
requirement. The hangar currently lacks necessary foam and wet
pipe fire protection systems, and requires a pavement upgrade
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to accommodate the heavier Coast Guard C-130 aircraft. The
Coast Guard functions are required to be centralized due to
unique operational and maintenance requirements in support of
a 24 hour immediate standby status for search and rescue
operations.
20. P-SOOT Clubs Addition
This project calls for the construction of
additions to the enlisted, officer, and CPO clubs in order to
accommodate the Navy personnel relocating to the air station.
The project proposes an 11620 sq ft enlisted club addition, an
8170 sq ft CPO club addition, and a 3352 sq ft officer club
addition. Kaneohe Bay does not currently have sufficient club
facilities to accommodate the relocating units.
21. P-501T Exchange
This project calls for the construction of a one-story
exchange retail building to support the relocating units from
Barbers Point. The exchange outlets will include cafeteria,
service outlet, snack stand, and auto parts facilities.
Exchange support areas will include administrative and
maintenance shop spaces. The existing assets at Kaneohe Bay
are unsuitable to satisfy the requirement.
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22. P-502T Mod/Dent Facility
This project calls for the construction of medical and
dental clinic additions, and an emergency vehicle shelter to
accommodate the relocating units from Barbers Point. The
proposed medical and dental additions are 3950 and 2067 sq ft,
respectively, while the vehicle shelter is 1800 sq ft. The air
station does not currently have medical/dental facilities to
support the relocating units.
23. P-503T Addition to Recreation Facility
This project calls for the construction of various
support and recreational facilities to support the personnel
relocating from Barbers Point. The project includes
construction of a gymnasium, theater, library, auto hobby
shop, pool, and bowling alley.
24. P-504T Utilities Upgrade
This project calls for the upgrade of the water,
electrical, and wastewater distribution systems in order to
accommodate the Navy operations at MCAS Kaneohe Bay. The
existing utility systems do not have adequate capacity to
support the relocating P-3 unit personnel.
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25. P-505T Aircraft Operations Facility
This project calls for constructing an aircraft
operations building, an aircraft line operations facility, a
refueling vehicle shop addition, and a controlled humidity
space. It also calls for expanding the control tower facility
and the fueling laboratory and support space. These facilities
are required to accommodate P-3 aircraft operations at Kaneohe
Bay.
26. P-506T Telecommunications Center
The ASCOMM telecommunications facility is a vital
element essential for support of the relocating VP squadrons.
The facilities provide the necessary integrated communications
to COMPATWINGSPAC as well as the home-based VP squadrons and
transient Patrol Aircraft squadrons (allied and reserve). This
is done via point-to-point, air-to-ground, voice, computer,
and data circuits. There are no other counter-parts that exist
that can perform ASCOMM responsibilities. The relocation with
the P-3 squadrons is a necessary part of maintaining their
mission capability.
27. P-507T Ordnance Facility
This project calls for the construction of magazines
for the stowage of war reserve material and other ordnance
presently stored at Barbers Point. The material includes such
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as torpedoes and missiles that can not be physically
accommodated by the existing Kaneohe Bay facilities. The
project is sited at Naval Magazine West Loch since the blast
separation distances for the magazines could not be satisfied
at Kaneohe Bay. There is no suitable existing magazine space
available at West Loch.
28. P-508T Ordnance Facility
This project calls for the construction of ordnance
facilities to accommodate the P-3 squadrons at Kaneohe Bay.
Project work includes construction of an air/underwater
weapons (AUW) shop, an above-ground ready magazine, and a
ready service locker. The project displaces an existing
amphibious assault LHA simulator deck. Relocation of the deck
is included in project P-287T.
29. P-538T Public Works Shop
This project calls for the construction of a new
public works facility to maintain essential facilities support
and transportation services to Navy and tenant activities in
the West Oahu area. The Barbers Point public works facility
currently services the entire West Oahu area and is forced to
relocate by the closure. The project will include construction
of warehouse, storage, maintenance and shop space, and fueling
station areas.
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30. P-539T Utility System Mod
This project calls for the modification of the Barbers
Point utility systems that will allow disposal of excess
property by discontinuing PWC utility services and obtaining
services from private sources. Separation of utilities is
required for the housing areas that are to be retained and the
areas of the base that will be disposed of. This modification
requires water and electrical line realignments, pump station
and substation relocations, and other modifications. Deletion
of this project would prevent disposal of the property.
B. NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
1. P-600T GSE Shop
This project calls for the construction of a new one-
story Ground Support Equipment (GSE) si.op and the renovation
of an existing GSE shop. There is insufficient space in
existing GSE facilities to adequately support A-6 and EA-6B
squadrons currently assigned. Assignment of P-3 squadrons will
further aggravate the deficiency. Additionally, GSE required
for P-3 squadrons is too heavy for the paved areas in the
equipment compound. The size and weight increase of P-3 GSE
would require a new facility even with the removal of A-6
tasking.
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2. P-601T Galley Upgrade
Project scope unavailable.
3. P-603T Aircraft Parking Apron Modification
The existing aircraft parking apron is configured for
A-6 aircraft which requires 1760 SY (square yards) per
aircraft. The parking area requirement for P-3 aircraft is
3560 SY per aircraft. The larger area necessitates relocation
of tiedowns, compressed air outlets, and electrical power
islands. Current locations of power islands create safety
hazards for P-3 aircraft while taxiing in or out of the apron.
High risk of hitting power stations with aircraft propellers
exist with present power island locations.
4. P-604T ASWOC/Tactical Support Center
This project calls for the construction of a
consolidated Tactical Support Center (TSC) to support the P-3
units from Barbers Point. The project proposes a two story
building with air conditioning, raised flooring,
uninteruptable power system, and site improvements. There is
no building available at Whidbey Island that is capable of
housing a tactical support center.
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5. P-605T Flight Simulator
This project calls for construction of a facility to
accommodate two P-3 cockpit training devices, one radar/ESM
operator trainer, and one acoustics trainer to support the P-3
mission. The trainers are needed to provide a realistic
cockpit environment and visual display for flight crew and
refresher training in operating P-3 equipment. Ti-e proposed
building would be a two-story reinforced concrete and masonry
facility with computer flooring, air-conditioning,
landscaping, and parking. There is no existing facility at
Kaneohe Bay that could be modified to house these trainers.




8. P-608T Hangar 6 Rehab
Hangar 6 is a modular type II hangar built in World
War II for medium bombers. The building is presently
configured for A-6 aircraft and will require renovation in
order to accommodate P-3 aircraft. The P-3 aircraft requires
numerous and diverse systems to accomplish its mission. These
systems include five different communication systems, two
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inertial navigation systems, two underwater acoustic tracking
systems, two radar systems, magnetic anomaly detection,
sonobuoy tracking, and electronic surveillance systems. These
systems require squadron maintenance and storage space that
are much higher than A-6 squadron requirements. The combined
higher maintenance and administrative space requirements make
it necessary to reconfigure space presently used for other
purposes. The physical size differences of the P-3 and the A-6
also drive other modification requirements such as increasing
crane capacities for lifting much heavier P-3 engines.
9. P-612T Engine Maintenance Shop
Although the A-6 is being phased out, A-6 and EA-6B
engines are essentially the same. The EA-6B will remain on
station, therefore the maintenance will still be required. The
A-6 phase out will reduce the demand for Ready For Issue (RFI)
engines but will not reduce the maintenance and storage space
required to work and test EA-6B engines. The P-3 engine
assembly requires different maintenance shops due to its
larger size and weight, and associated propellers, gearbox,
etc. The four engines per P-3 vice two per A-6 increases
storage and maintenance requirements.
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10. P-613T High Power Turn
Project scope unavailable.
11. P-615T Sonobuoy Storage
This project calls for the construction of a one-story
pre-engineered building with loading ramp and platform,
propane hot water system, security system, and parking area.
This sonobuoy storage facility is required because existing
storage space is fully utilized by the reserve P-3 squadron
already assigned to Whidbey Island.
12. P-616T CPWP HQ
This project calls for the construction of a two-story
reinforced concrete and masonry building to be used as
COMPATWINGSPAC staff administrative space. There is currently
insufficient space in existing facilities to accommodate the
additional administrative requirement.
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